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ABSTRACT
Most investment expenditures are at least partly irreversible
-- although capital in place can be sold from one firm to another,
its scrap value is often small because it has no alternative use
other than that originally intended for it. An emerging litera-
ture has shown that this makes investment decisions highly
sensitive to uncertainty over future market conditions, and in
theory changes in risk levels should strongly affect investment
spending. However, explicit measures of risk are usually missing
from empirical investment models.
This paper discusses the effects of risk on investment and
capacity choice, and explains why q theory and related investment
models, based on the rule "invest when the marginal value of a
unit of capital is at least as large as the cost of the unit," are
theoretically flawed. It argues that the inclusion of explicit
measures of risk can help explain and predict investment
spending. The results of causality tests and a set of simple
regressions are presented that strongly support this argument.
1. Introduction.
It is obvious to any business person that economic decisions often
depend critically on the nature and extent of market risk. Clearly a
decision to invest in new capital will depend not only on projections of
market demand, but also on the degree to which future demand is uncertain.
Indeed, much of corporate finance theory, as taught in business schools,
deals with methods for properly taking risk into account when making capital
budgeting decisions. Yet most econometric models of aggregate economic
activity ignore the role of risk, or deal with it only implicitly. The
point of this paper is that a more explicit treatment of risk may help to
better explain and forecast economic fluctuations, and especially movements
in investment spending.
Consider, for example, the recessions of 1975 and 1980. The sharp
jumps in world energy prices that occured in 1974 and 1979-80 clearly
contributed to those recessions, and they did so in a number of ways.
First, they caused a reduction in the real national incomes of oil importing
countries. Second, they led to "adjustment effects" -- inflation and a
further drop in real income and output resulting from the rigidities that
prevented wages and non-energy prices from coming into equilibrium quickly.1
But those energy shocks also caused greater uncertainty over future
economic conditions. For example, it was unclear whether energy prices
would continue to rise or later fall, what the impact of higher energy
prices would be on the marginal product of various types of capital, how
long-lived the inflationary impact of those shocks would be, etc. Other
1For a discussion of these effects, see Pindyck (1980) and Pindyck and
Rotemberg (1984).
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events also contributed to what became a more uncertain economic environ-
ment, especially in 1979-82: much more volatile exchange rates, and (at
least in the U.S.) more volatile interest rates. This increased uncertainty
must have contributed to the decline in investment spending that occured
during these periods.2
This more volatile economic environment was reflected in an increase in
the volatility of U.S. stock prices. From 1970 to 1981, the average monthly
variance of the New York Stock Exchange Index was about 2.5 times as large
as for the period 1950-1969. This increase in stock market volatility can
be explained in part by the more volatile economic conditions described
above. Elsewhere I have argued that it corresponds to an increase in the
variance of the real gross marginal return on capital. 3 Again, this should
have affected investment spending, and economic performance in general.
In what follows I will focus on investment spending, and argue that a
more explicit treatment of risk is needed to better model and forecast
investment at the aggregate or sectoral level. This is particularly true
when investment is irreversible, as most investment is, at least in part.
In such a case the decision to invest involves an additional opportunity
cost -- installing capital today forecloses the possibility of installing it
instead at some point in the future (or never installing it at all). Put
differently, a firm has options to install capital at various points in the
future (options that can be exercised at the cost of purchasing the
2This point was made by Bernanke (1983), particularly with respect to
changes in oil prices. Also, see Evans (1984) and Tatom (1984) for a
discussion of the depressive effects of increased interest rate volatility.
3See Pindyck (1984). That paper also argues that the increase in the
variance of stock returns may have been partly responsible for the decline
in real stock prices over the period 1965-81.
capital), and if the firm installs capital now, it closes those options. If
uncertainty over future market conditions increases, the opportunity cost
associated with closing these options increases, and current investment
spending becomes less attractive.
In the next two sections I explain this aspect of firms' investment
decisions in more detail, and discuss the implications for q-theory models
of investment. Section 4 presents the results of some simple (and prelimi-
nary) empirical tests. These results indicate that risk does seem to help
explain and predict aggregate investment spending.
2. The Determinants of Investment Spending.
The explanation of aggregate and sectoral investment behavior remains
especially problematic in the development of macro-econometric models.
Existing models have had, at best, limited success in explaining or
predicting investment. The problem is not simply that these models have
been able to explain and predict only a small portion of the movements in
investment. In addition, constructed quantities that in theory should have
strong explanatory power -- e.g. Tobin's q, or various measures of the cost
of capital -- in practice do not, and leave much of investment spending
unexplained.4
It is easy to think of reasons for the failings of these models. For
example, even leaving aside problems with their theoretical underpinnings,
there are likely to be formidable estimation problems resulting from
aggregation (across firms, and also across investment projects of different
4See Kopcke (1985) for an overview, as well as examples and comparisons
of traditional approaches to modelling investment spending.
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gestations). I will not attempt to survey these problems here, nor in any
way provide a general overview of the state of investment modelling.
Instead I want to focus on one special aspect of investment - the role of
risk, and in particular the effects on investment spending of uncertainty
over future values of the marginal revenue product of capital.
Of course non-diversifiable risk plays a role in even the simplest
models of investment, by affecting the cost of capital. But there is an
emerging literature that suggests that risk may be a more crucial explanator
of investment. The thrust of this literature begins with the fact that much
of investment spending is irreversible -- i.e. a widget factory, once
constructed, can be used to make widgets, but not much else. Given this
irreversibility, one must view an investment expenditure as essentially the
exercising of an option (an option to productively invest). But once such
an option is exercised, it is "dead," i.e. one cannot decide to exercise it
instead at some point in the future, or never at all. In other words, one
gives up the option of waiting for new information (about evolving demand
and cost conditions), and using that information to re-evaluate the desira-
bility and/or timing of the expenditure.5
This lost option value must be included as part of the cost of the
investment. Doing so leads to an investment rule that is different from the
5This is developed in the recent papers by Bernanke (1983) and McDonald
and Siegel (1986). Other examples of this literature include Cukierman
(1980), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), and Majd and Pindyck (1985). In the
papers by Bernanke and Cukierman, uncertainty over future market conditions
is reduced as time passes, so that firms have an incentive to delay
investing when markets are volatile (e.g. during recessions). In the
other papers, future market conditions are always uncertain. But as with a
call option on a dividend-paying stock, an investment expenditure should be
made only when the value of the resulting project exceeds its cost by a
positive amount, and again, increased uncertainty will increase the incen-
tive to delay the investment.
III
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standard rule: "Invest when the marginal value of a unit of capital is at
least as large as the purchase and installation cost of the unit." Instead,
the marginal value of the unit must exceed the purchase and installation
cost by an amount equal to the value of keeping the firm's option to invest
alive.
To see this more clearly, consider a firm that has some degree of
monopoly power (i.e. faces a downward sloping demand curve), and must decide
how much initial output capacity to install. (To keep things simple we will
ignore any lumpiness in investment, and assume that the firm can chose any
output capacity it wants.) Again, a key assumption is that the firm's
investment is irreversible -- although capital in place can be sold by one
firm to another, its scrap value is small because it has no alternative use
other than that originally intended for it (e.g. to produce widgets).
Let AV(K) denote the value to the firm of an incremental unit of
capacity, given that the firm already has capacity K. Determining AV(K) in
practice is a non-trivial matter, because it will be a highly nonlinear
function of (unknown) future demands. For example, if future demand falls,
this incremental unit of capacity might not be used by the firm. As a
result, methods other than discounted cash flow techniques are needed to
calculate AV(K).6 We will not be concerned with this problem here, and
instead simply assume that AV(K) can indeed be calculated. It will of
course be a declining function of K.
Given that the firm knows AV(K), it must now decide whether to install
6As noted by McDonald and Siegel -(1985), once a unit of capital is in
place, the firm has the option of whether or not to utilize it as market
conditions evolve. Thus option pricing methods can be used to value the
unit. Implications for marginal investment decisions and capacity choice is
examined in Pindyck (1986).
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the incremental unit. Although the firm has the option to install the unit,
it might not want to exercise this option.7 Deciding whether or not to
exercise this option is the key to the firm's investment decision.
In order to determine when to exercise its option to invest, the firm
must also value the option. Again, we are concerned here with an
incremental unit of capacity, given a current capacity K, i.e. a unit that
has value AV(K). Denote by AF(K) the value of the firm's option to install
this incremental unit. Note that this option has value even if it is
currently not optimal for the firm to exercise it (just as a call option on
shares of a common stock has value even if it will not be exercised today).
Also, the greater the uncertainty over future demand, the greater will be
the value of this option (just as a call option has greater, value the
greater the price volatility of the stock on which it is written).
Assume the cost of a unit of capital is constant, and denote this cost
by k. Then k is the "exercise price" of the firm's option on the incre-
mental unit of capital, i.e. the price the firm must pay to exercise the
option. Suppose demand conditions are such that it is rational for the firm
to exercise the option. In that case, AF(K) = AV(K) - k. Now suppose
instead that AF(K) > AV(K) - k. This might be the case, for example, if
current K is large and future demand is extremely uncertain, in which case
the firm will want to hold its option to invest, rather than exercise it.
Then what is the firm's optimal choice of capacity K? It is the largest
level K* such that:
7What gives a firm this option? It may be that the firm owns a patent
on a particular production technology. More generally, the firm's
managerial resources and expertise, reputation and market position enable it
to productively undertake investments that indivduals or other firms
cannot undertake.
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AV(K*) = k + AF(K*) (1)
In other words, the firm should keep adding capacity until it reaches the
point where the value of the marginal unit is just equal to its purchase
cost plus the value of the option to install the unit (an option that is
closed, yielding AV(K) - k, once the unit is indeed installed).
Now, what is the effect of an increase in uncertainty over future
demand conditions? The immediate effect, whatever the current capacity K,
is to increase the value of the firm's option to invest in the marginal
unit, i.e. to increase AF(K). But this means that all else equal, the firm
will want to hold less capacity than it would otherwise. The reason is that
it is now worth more to the firm to keep its option to invest alive. Thus
an increase in uncertainty will reduce firms' desired capital stocks, and
have a depressive effect on investment spending.
If there is considerable uncertainty over future demand conditions the
value of the firm's options to invest will be large, and an investment rule
that ignores this will be grossly in error. In fact, as the important paper
by McDonald and Siegel (1986) has shown, for even moderate levels of
uncertainty the effect can be quite large; an investment in an individual
projects might require that the present value of the project be at least
double the cost of the project. Also, changes in the level of uncertainty
can have a major effect on the critical present value needed for a positive
investment decision, and thus such changes should have a major effect on
investment spending.
In most modelling work, effects of risk are handled by assuming that a
risk premium can be added to the discount rate used to calculate the present
value of a project. That discount rate is typically obtained from the
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Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). But as we have learned from the theory
of financial option pricing, the correct discount rate cannot be obtained
without actually solving the option valuation problem, generally will not be
constant over time, and will not equal the average cost of capital for the
firm. As a result, simple cost of capital measures, based on rates of
return (simple or adjusted) to equity and debt, may be poor explanators of
investment spending.
3. Marginal and Investment.
In essence, the q theory of investment says that firms have an
incentive to invest whenever marginal q -- the present value of a marginal
unit of capital divided by the cost of that unit -- exceeds one. But models
based on this theory have not been very successful in explaining invest-
ment.8 There may be several reasons for this failing, but one possibility
is that if risk is significant, the model is theoretically flawed. In fact
marginal q should not equal one in equilibrium. Instead it should exceed
one, because as we have seen, investment should occur only when the present
value of a marginal unit of capital exceeds the cost of the unit by an
amount equal to the value of keeping the firm's option to invest alive.
To see this more clearly, let us return to the problem of a firm
deciding whether to invest in an incremental unit of capacity. Recall that
the optimal investment decision is to invest up to the point K* where AV(K*)
= k + AF(K*). Marginal q is the present value of the marginal unit of
8For example, Abel and Blanchard (1983) find that even when it is
properly measured, marginal q "is a significant explanator of investment,
but leaves unexplained a large, serially correlated fraction of invest-
ment." Also, see Kopcke (1985).
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capital -- in my notation, AV(K ) -- divided by the cost of the unit, k.
Then clearly q = AV(K*) > 1 in equilibrium.
A correct measure for marginal q could be defined as:
* * *
q = [AV(K ) - AF(K*)]/k (2)
which will equal 1 in equilibrium. The problem is that this measure cannot
be observed directly, nor can it easily be computed from other firm or
industry-wide data. Furthermore, the use of an average measure of q (the
market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost of its capital)
will be even more misleading. The reason is that the market value of the
firm will include the value of capital in place plus the value of the firm's
options to install more capital in the future.9 What is needed instead is
the value of capital in place less the value of those options.
Since the q theory has become prominent as a basis for structural
models of investment spending, it is useful to discuss it in somewhat more
detail. I do this with reference to the recent paper by Abel and Blanchard
(1983). The model that they developed is one of the most sophisticated
attempts to explain investment in a q theory framework; it uses a carefully
constructed measure for marginal rather than average q, incorporates
delivery lags and costs of adjustment, and explicitly models expectations of
future values of explanatory variables.
The model is based on the standard discounted cash flow rule, "invest
in the marginal unit of capital if the present discounted value of the
9Assuming the firm has chosen its capacity optimally, its value is
given by:
K*
Value =f AV(K)dK + f AF(K)dK
0 K*
i.e. the value of capital in place plus the value of options to productively
install more capital in the future.
III
- 10 -
expected flow of profits resulting from the unit is at least equal to the
cost of the unit." Let t(Kt,It) be the maximum value of profits at time t,
given the capital stock Kt and investment level It, i.e. it is the value of
profits assuming that variable factors are used optimally. It depends on It
because of costs of adjustment; aT/aI < 0, and 82r/3I2 < 0, i.e. the more
rapidly new capital is purchased and installed, the more costly it is. Then
the present value of current and future profits is given by:
Vt Et[j [ (l+Rt+i) ]It+j(Kt+jIt+j)] (3)j=0 i=O
where Et denotes an expectation, and R is the discount rate. Maximizing
this with respect to It, subject to the condition Kt = (1-6)Kt_l + It (where
6 is the rate of depreciation), gives the following marginal condition:
-Et(a3t/aIt) = qt ' (4a)
where qt = Et[ Z [ (1+Rt+i ) ]( +j/aKt+j)(1-6) (4b)j=0 i=0 t+j t+j
In other words investment should occur up to the point where the cost of an
additional unit of capital is just equal to the present value of the
expected flow of incremental profits resulting from the unit. Abel and
Blanchard estimate both linear and quadratic approximations to qt. and use
vector autoregressive representations of Rt and ant/Kt to model expec-
tations of future values. Their representation of Rt is based on a
weighted average of the rates of return on equity and debt.
If the correct discount rates Rt+i were known, eqns. (4a) and (4b)
would indeed accurately represent the optimal investment decision of the
firm. The problem is that these discount rates are usually not known, and
generally will not be eual to the average cost of capital of the firm, or
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some related variable. Instead, these discount rates can only be determined
as part of the solution to the firm's optimal investment problem, This
involves valuing the firm's options to make (irreversible) marginal
investments (now or in the future), and determining the conditions for the
optimal exercise of those options. Thus the solution to the investment
problem is more complicated than the first-order condition given by (4a) and
(4b) would suggest.
As an example, consider a project that has zero systematic (non-
diversifiable) risk. The use of a risk-free interest rate for R would lead
to much too large a value for qt. and might suggest that an investment
expenditure should be made, whereas in fact it should be delayed. Further-
more, there is no simple way to adjust R properly. The problem is that the
calculation ignores the opportunity cost of exercising the option to
invest. This may be why Abel and Blanchard conclude that "our data are not
sympathetic to the basic restrictions imposed by the q theory, even extended
to allow for simple delivery lags."
4. Does Risk Help Explain Investment Spending?
We have seen that when investment is irreversible, there is an
especially strong link between risk and investment spending. An increase in
uncertainty over future demand raises the value of the firm's option to
invest in a marginal unit of capital, and therefore raises the incentive to
keep that option alive (by not investing) rather than exercising it (by
investing), so that other things equal, investment spending will fall.
Furthermore, recent studies have shown that in theory, this effect can be
- 12 -
quantitatively important.l0 But do the data support the theory?
A major problem with testing the theory is finding a good measure of
market uncertainty. One possibility is to use survey data. An alternative,
which I pursue here, is to use data on the stock market. When product
markets become more volatile, we would expect stock prices to also become
more volatile, so that the variance of stock returns will be larger. This
was indeed the case, for example, during the recessions of 1975 and 1980,
and most dramatically during the Great Depression. Thus the variance of
aggregate stock returns should be a reasonable measure of aggregate product
market uncertainty.
Stock returns themselves are also a predictor of aggregate investment
spending, as was illustrated by the recent work of Fischer and Merton
(1984). We would expect stock returns to have predictive power because they
reflect new information about economic variables. That new information can
imply revised exectations about future corporate earnings, and changes in
the discount rates used to capitalize those earnings. Fischer and Merton
show that the predictive power of stock returns is strong, not only with
respect to aggregate investment spending, but with respect to other
components of GNP as well.
Our concern here is whether the variance of stock returns -- my measure
of aggregate product market uncertainty -- also has predictive power with
respect to investment, and whether that predictive power goes beyond that of
stock returns themselves, as well as other variables that would usually
appear in an empirical investment equation. Ideally, this should be
IOSee McDonald and Siegel (1986), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Majd and
Pindyck (1985), and Pindyck (1986).
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examined in the context of a structural model of investment derived from
firms' optimizing decisions. However, such a model would be quite compli-
cated, especially if it were to take account of construction lags, capital
of different vintages, etc. Instead, I conduct two related tests of an
exploratory nature.
First, I test whether the variance of stock returns can be said to
"cause" the real growth rate of investment, in the sense of Granger (1969)
and Sims (1972). To say that "X causes Y," two conditions should be met.
First, X should help to predict Y, i.e. in a regression of Y against past
values of Y, the addition of past values of X as independent variables
should contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the regression.
Second, Y should not help to predict X. (If X helps to predict Y and Y
helps to predict X, it is likely that one or more other variables are in
fact "causing" both X and Y.)
In each case I test the null hypothesis that one variable does not help
predict the other. For example, to test the null hypothesis that "X does
not cause Y," I regress Y against lagged values of Y and lagged values of X
(the "unrestricted" regression), and then regress Y only against lagged
values of Y (the "restricted" regression). A simple F test is used to
determine whether the lagged values of X contribute significantly to the
explanatory power of the first regression.1 1 If they do, I can reject the
l1The F-statistic is as follows:
F = (N - k)(SSRr - SSRu)/r(SSRu)
where SSRr and SSRU are the sums of squared residuals in the restricted and
unrestricted regressions respectively, N is the number of observations, k is
the number of estimated parameters in the unrestricted regression, and r is
the number of parameter restrictions. This statistic is distributed as
F(r/N-k).
X-----l- ---^11_ ___
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null hypothesis and conclude that the data are consistent with X causing Y.
The null hypothesis that "Y does not cause X" is then tested in the same
manner.
A weakness of this test of causality is that a third variable, Z, might
in fact be causing Y, but might be contemporaneously correlated with X. For
example, lagged values of the variance of stock returns might be a signifi-
cant explanator of the growth of investment in a bivariate regression, but
might become insignifant when other variables are added, such as stock
returns themselves, interest rates, etc. Therefore as a second exploratory
test I also run a set of simple regressions of the growth rate of investment
against stock returns, the variance of stock returns, and a set of
additional explanatory variables that usually appear in empirical investment
equations.
Data.
These causality tests and multivariate regressions require a series for
the variance of stock returns. I constructed such a series using daily data
for the total logarithmic return on the combined value-weighted New York and
American Stock Exchange Index, obtained from the CRISP tape. From this
daily data I constructed non-overlapping estimates of the monthly variance
by calculating the sample variance, corrected for non-trading days. I then
sum the monthly estimates for each quarter, to obtain a series of
non-overlapping estimates of the quarterly variance, denoted by VAR. The
returns themselves were also summed over each quarter and then adjusted for
inflation, to yield a quarterly series for real stock returns (RTRN).
Because the daily stock return data were available only from the 4th
quarter of 1962 through the 4th quarter of 1983, and because the causality
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tests and regressions require lags of several quarters, the sample is
limited to the 21 year period 1963-4 to 1983-4.
I test whether the variance of stock returns can help predict the
growth rate of real non-residential fixed investment (INGR). I also examine
the two major components of INGR, the growth rate of real investment in
structures (ISGR), and the growth rate of real investment in durable
equipment (IEGR). These multivariate regressions also include the following
additional explanatory variables: the quarterly change in the BAA corporate
bond rate (DRBAA), the change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate (DRTB3), the
change in the rate of inflation as measured by the rate of growth of the
Producer Price Index (DINF), and the growth rate of real GNP (GNPGR).
Series for real investment and its components, GNP, the Producer Price
Index, and the interest rates were all obtained from the Citibank database.
Causality Tests.
Granger causality tests are conducted as follows. For each investment
series (INGR, ISGR, IEGR), we test the pair of null hypotheses: (i) VAR does
not help predict the growth rate of investment, and (ii) the growth rate of
investment does not help predict VAR. If we reject the first hypothesis and
accept the second, then the data are consistent with variance of stock
returns causing investment. Each hypothesis is tested by running the
unrestricted regression,
n n
Yt = a + b.Y t + cX (6)i=l 1 -i i= t-i 
and the restricted regression,
n
i1 i t-i (7)
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and testing the parameter restrictions ci = 0 for all i. (See Footnote
11.) The tests are done for the number of lags, n, equal to 4 and 6.
The results of these causality tests are summarized in Table 1, which
shows the R2's for the restricted and unrestricted regressions, and the
F-statistic for the restrictions ci = 0. Observe that for every investment
variable and for both 4 and 6 lags, we reject the null hypothesis "variance
does not help predict the growth of investment," and we fail to reject the
opposite null hypothesis "the growth of investment helps to predict
variance." This is at least preliminary evidence that market risk, as
measured by the variance of stock returns, plays a significant role in the
determination of investment spending.
Multivariate Regressions.
As a further test, I run a set of regressions similar to those used by
Fischer and Merton (1984) in their study of the predictive power of stock
returns. Each investment variable is regressed first against lagged values
of variance, then against lagged values of variance and lagged values of
real stock returns, and finally against lagged variance, lagged stock
returns, and the lagged values of four additional variables: the change in
the BAA corporate bond rate, the change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate,
the change in the rate inflation, and the rate of growth of real GNP.
The results are summarized in Table 2. Note that three lagged values
of each independent variable appear in the regressions, but only the sum of
the estimated coefficients is shown for each variable, together with an
associated t-statistic.
As one would expect from the results of the causality tests, variance
is highly significant when it appears as the only independent variable.
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Variance continues to be highly significant after adding real stock returns
to the regression, and this second independent variable is also a signifi-
cant explanator of the growth of total non-residential investment, as
Fischer and Merton found, as well as investment in equipment, but it is not
significant for investment in structures. When the remaining explanatory
variables are added, variance continues to be significant in the regressions
for non-residential investment and structures, but not for equipment. (The
only significant explanator of equipment investment is the BAA bond rate.)
This may reflect the fact that the irreversibility of investment is greater
for structures than for equipment.
But the importance of our risk measure is also evident from the magni-
tudes of the variance coefficients. The quarterly variance of stock returns
went from about .01 in the 1960's to about .02 in the mid-1970's. From
regressions 3, 6, and 9 we see that this implies an approximately 4.5
percentage point decline in the growth rate of investment in structures (a
drop from around 5 percent real growth during the 1960's to only slightly
positive real growth), a 2.5 percentage point drop in the growth rate of
investment in equipment, and a 3 percentage point drop in the growth rate of
total investment.
5. Conclusions.
I argued in the beginning of this paper that there are good theoretical
reasons to expect market risk to have a major role in the determination of
investment spending. This idea is not new; it has been elaborated upon in a
number of articles during the past few years. However, it seems to be
missing from most empirical work on investment. This may be a reflection of
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the fact that most theoretical models of irreversible investment under
uncertainty are quite complicated, so that their translation into well-
specified empirical models represents a formidable task.
This paper has not attempted to make that translation. Instead I have
sought and found only a rough empirical verification for the importance of
risk. The tests and regressions reported in the previous section should be
viewed as exploratory, and limited in their implications. For example, they
are based on highly aggregated data, and what is probably a very imperfect
measure of market risk.
Nonetheless, these findings support recent theoretical results
regarding the effects of risk on irreversible investment, and they suggest
that the explicit inclusion of market risk measures can improve our ability
to explain and predict investment spending. The development of structural
models that include such measures should be an important research priority.
III
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Table 1 - Causality Tests
(Quarterly Data: 1963-4 to 1983-4)
n n
Regression of: Yt = a + biYt-i + CiXt-i
i=1 i=1
Regression Pair 2 2
No. Lag (n) Y X R/Ru F(HO b=0)
1 4 INGR VAR .355/.495 4.98
2 4 VAR INGR .298/.356 1.63
3 4 ISGR VAR .201/.326 3.33
4 4 VAR ISGR .298/.347 1.38
5 4 IEGR VAR .277/.442 5.33
6 4 VAR IEGR .298/.337 1.09
7 6 INGR VAR .388/.548 3.87
8 -6 VAR INGR .299/.410 2.05
9 6 ISGR VAR .225/.361 2.35
10 6 VAR ISGR .299/.404 1.94
11 6 IEGR VAR .304/.473 3.52
12 6 VAR IEGR .299/.388 1.58
#F(4/75) for n = 4, F(6/66) for n = 6.
,ignificant at 5% level.
Significant at 1% level.
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Table 2 - Variance of Stock Returns as a Predictor of Investment
(Quarterly Data, 1963-4 to 1983-4)
Indep. Dependent Variable
Var. INGR INGR INGR ISGR ISGR ISGR
Reg. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
CONST
IEGR IEGR IEGR
7 8 9
.0314 .0264 .0199 .0261 .0228 .0190 .0349 .0291 .0201
(7.72) (6.30) (2.38) (5.36) (4.28) (1.75) (6.96) (5.67) (2.01)
i VARi -6.307
=1 -(-5.98)
i RTRNi=1 -1
-5.306 -3.282
(-4.92)(-2.32)
.1738 .1229
(3.46) (1.91)
-6.262 -5.470 -4.786
(-4.98)(-4.20)(-2.59)
.0769 .0887
(1.22) (1.05)
-6.478 -5.378 -2.563
(-4.99)(-4.08)(-1.51)
.2150 .1388
(3.49) (1.80)
i DRBAA ii=1
j DRTB3
=1 -
iDINF-i
i11 
jGNPGR
i=1
.0222 .0187 .0108 .0226 .0202
(2.95) (2.59) (1.46) (2.51) (2.20)
.0126
(1.32)
.0215 .0174 .0096
(2.33) (1.97) (1.11)
.425 .501 .627
.0204 .0194 .0184SER
.320 .335 .477
.0244 .0247 .0239
.350 .442 .596
.0252 .0238 .0216
DW 1.40 1.53 1.84 1.65 1.67 1.88 1.60 1.78 2.19
Variables: INGR = Quarterly growth rate of real business fixed
investment.
ISGR = Growth rate of real investment in structures.
IEGR = Growth rate of real investment in durable equipment.
VAR = Quarterly variance of real return on NYSE Index.
RTRN = Real return on NYSE Index.
DRBAA = Change in BAA corporate bond rate.
DRTB3 = Change in 3-month Treasury bill rate.
DINF = Change in inflation rate, as measured by PPI.
GNPGR = Quarterly growth rate of real GNP.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
- .0056
(-0.41)
-.0308
(-2.93)
.0167
(2.44)
-.2827
(-0.41)
.3505
(0.66)
- .0409
(-3.25)
.0199
(2.23)
RHO
.0144
(1.76)
-.9405
(-1.05)
.1495
(0.18)
.0816
(0.18)
.5428
(0.86)
III
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